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MR. GOLDSTEIN: I am delighted to be moderating this panel on
"Copyright's, Long Arm: Enforcing Copyrights Abroad." When the
SLATA organizers proposed this topic as one of the topics for today's
conference, I told them, Jim in particular, that I could not think of a more
important issue facing copyright today, domestically or internationally. I
believe that statement even more so today than I did a few months ago
when I made it to Jim. As important though as this narrow topic is, dealing
with copyright long arm jurisdiction and enforcing copyrights abroad, it
ramifies into three equally important and more general issues. I would just
like by the way of introduction to say a word on each. First, the field that
this issue occupies is not just the field of jurisdiction, but rather the more
general field of what the Europeans call "private international law."
Specifically, in this case, questions of territoriality. The question not only
of the extent to which one country can allow a private party to haul a
citizen of another country into that country's courts and adjudicate that
person's rights, but also the question of the extent to which one nation can
impose its intellectual property norms on conduct that occurs in other
countries. Other questions that arise and that I think will be alluded to in

t On March 15, 2003, the Stanford Law and Technology Association (SLATA) presented a
symposium on creating and protecting intellectual property in the international arena, or "Ideas
Without Boundaries." The following is an edited version of the transcript from the conference
panel and discussion. More information about SLATA and its conferences can be found at
http://slata.stanford.edu.
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the course of panel discussion today involve questions of choice of law:
what law does apply to particular forms of infringement and choice of
forum? What fora are open and what fora might be closed to certain
intellectual property causes of action? The second point, at which the
narrow topic ramifies, is that really we are talking not just about copyright
and the Internet, although that will be the focus of discussion this
afternoon. But copyright and the Internet are, I think, harbingers of issues,
some of which are already facing us, but others of which will loom very
large in the coming years. The question of domain names also is very much
with us and is a function, of course, of the Internet. We are going to see
trademark law raising issues of the sort that are being discussed today.
And., once you get off the Internet, but within the context of a globalized
economy, we are going to find that patents raise exactly the same kinds of
issues of jurisdiction, territoriality, enforcement, and applicable law. The
third point and last point at which the specific topic ramifies is that
although the way the topic for the panel's discussions has been phrased is,
"To what extent can U.S. law, U.S. intellectual property, be enforced
respecting conduct abroad?" I think that the topic really is not just about
U.S. content or U.S. content owners seeking to protect their products. The
United States was a net intellectual property importer in the nineteenth
century. It became the world's preeminent intellectual property exporter in
the twentieth century, and it may well become a net intellectual property
importer again in the twenty-first century. Compare the numbers on video
game sales, which have outstripped DVD and video cassette sales, and
consider that their country of origin is not necessarily the United States.
This is, I think, a good moment in our history to reflect on the capacities of
other nations to support and sustain flourishing intellectual property
industries.
Your organizers have chosen our panel extremely well and I am
grateful to the panelists for coming to Stanford today to speak with us. You
have their biographies and so I am not going to take any time to relate
those, but I would like to welcome them in the order in which they will be
speaking. First, Rufus Pichler, who will be providing an overview of these
private international law issues. He will be followed by Larry Hadley and
David Kendall, focusing on the Kazaal litigation as an example of the kinds
of issues we are talking about-a case study-and enlarging from that. Carl
Oppedahl, who will be looking at these issues from the point of view of

1. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
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users, the so-called "intellectual property underdogs," those who may
perceive that they have been over-reached upon by intellectual property
content owners. Each has agreed to speak for fifteen minutes and we will
take them consecutively. That should leave us about one-half hour for
Q-and-A. I understand that you are a lively group in terms of having
questions-I do not know about answers-but having lots of questions, and
so we will hope to have plenty of time for that at the close. But why don't
we start, Rufus, with you?
MR. PICHLER: Thank you very much, I am happy to be here. As
Paul indicated, I am going to offer an overview of some of the issues
regarding jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement in this context-the
context of cross-border enforcement of judgments or of intellectual
property rights. But I am going to focus on judgments in the context where
infringement originates abroad and infringes rights in the U.S. Obviously,
you can turn this scenario around, you know, infringement could originate
in the U.S., or in any other country, and infringe rights in other countries,
and I will touch upon these issues while I go. I will take this in three steps.
The first being, if you want to enforce intellectual property rights, the first
choice you have to make is if you bring a lawsuit, where you want to bring
it? Do you want to bring it locally in the United States, or do you want to
go to a foreign country to bring a lawsuit there, or maybe the country where
the infringement originates? Secondly, once you have obtained a judgment,
can you enforce the judgment locally in the U.S. or do you have to go
abroad and have it recognized and enforced? Thirdly, if you find that
enforcement in a foreign country is too cumbersome, you may want to
focus on other potential defendants that may be local, that may be in the
U.S. I am just going to note some developments or tendencies where this is
happening in this context.
On the first point, obtaining a judgment, obviously, the first choice is
do you bring an action in the U.S., or do you bring it abroad? I am going to
focus on bringing an action in the U.S. and then trying to either enforce it
locally or abroad. [Regarding] the first issue, personal jurisdiction and
subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts, I am not going to go into details
of personal jurisdiction. I believe that is probably going to be addressed in
the course of the panel, but just two issues to think about. In this context it
is not only about finding a U.S. court that will have personal jurisdiction
over the matter, but keep in mind in this context that it may be important to,
at this stage, already, look at where you will have to enforce the judgment.
Because, almost universally, one of the requirements for enforcement and
recognition of foreign judgments is that the court rendering the judgment
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has jurisdiction according to the rules of the court recognizing the judgment
over their subject matter. So if you seek a court that exercises exorbitant
jurisdiction, or jurisdiction that is deemed excessive in other countries, it
will be very problematic to have this judgment enforced in other countries.
The second choice you likely make is what sort of relief are you seeking.
Are you seeking preliminary relief, a TRO or preliminary injunction, or are
you seeking a permanent injunction to stop the infringing conduct, and/or
are you seeking damages? In each of these three cases, different issues arise
with respect to international enforcement of judgments.
First, on the preliminary injunctions, temporary restraining order, as a
general matter, it would be very difficult if not impossible to have a
preliminary judgment enforced in any other country. There is a strong
opposition to enforcing preliminary measures or preliminary judgments
because there has been no full trial on the merits, so that will be the likely
choice only if you have an opportunity to locally enforce that preliminary
measure. For example, because the defendant, although it may be located in
a foreign country, operates a server in the U.S. on which files are stored,
for example. A permanent injunction, the issue arising there and being
discussed is that of the so-called cross border injunction or extraterritorial
injunction. And, as Paul indicated, the background to this is that intellectual
property rights are territorial in nature so if I allege infringement of a
copyright in the U.S., this is limited to the U.S. The U.S. law does not
apply extraterritorially and the infringement, or a conduct, may be an
infringement in the U.S., but not in another country. So if I seek an
injunction in the U.S., for example, against a foreign-based provider of a
peer-to-peer file sharing system, or a party that is involved in a peer-to-peer
file sharing system, all I could do under U.S. law is to have this party
enjoined from infringing in the United States, under U.S. law.
Obviously, U.S. courts are not precluded from applying foreign law in
the same case. So, if the provider is located outside the U.S., and I want a
cross border injunction-I wanted to preclude him from operating the
service from wherever the provider is located-the court would likely have
to apply foreign law to enjoin that party from doing what the party does in
a foreign country. And the issue there obviously is the outcome may be
different. The conduct may constitute an infringement in the U.S., like in
the Kazaa scenario that we will be discussing later, may constitute
infringement here, for example, in the form of contributory infringement,
but it may not in another country because the rules on contributory
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infringement are different. In the Kazaa case, 2 for example, the Kazaa
entity has been found not to infringe contributorally in the Netherlands, and
I believe that the outcome would be similar under German law, basically
because the courts find that what Kazaa does is closer to what Sony did in
the Betamax case.3 Just providing a device, or a software in this case, that
has substantial amount of infringing use, and has no control of what
happens later-closer to that-than to the Napster4 or Aimster5 scenario
that has been decided in the U.S., where the courts found there is
substantial control over what the users do with the stuff. So depending on
what the outcome is under the applicable, possibly multiple applicable
laws, you may or may not get an injunction that is broader than, or that
covers more than the territory of the U.S. Of course, on a practical level, it
may well be that the only way that a foreign provider can comply with an
injunction that enjoins him from doing what the provider does in the United
States is to shut the service down completely, just because it may not be
possible to zone or target or exclude only U.S. users in the Internet context.
That is, by the way, what Yahoo 6 found and I do not know how many are
familiar with the Yahoo case. That was also the issue in the Yahoo case,
which was not a copyright case, but a similar issue where Yahoo was ruled
in France to violate local laws and the practical effect of the French
judgment was that they would have had to shut down the service for the
entire world.7 But that is not a legal consequence, that is only the
consequence on the practical implementation of how you want to or can
comply with the judgment.
If you seek damages there are similar issues. Will a U.S. court award
damages for infringement occurring abroad, or will it limit the damages to
the financial consequences that occur in the U.S.? [U]nder U.S. law, U.S.
courts may award damages under U.S. copyright law if a local infringing
act enables further exploitation abroad. That is likely, I believe, not the
scenario in the case we are talking about, because there is not a local
infringement that will then enable further exploitation abroad, but is rather

2. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
Cal. 2003) (summary judgment motion granted with regard to contributory and vicarious
infringement in favor of Grokster and StreamCast Networks, Inc., distributors of peer-to-peer
software employed by Kazaa users).
3. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
4. A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
5. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
6. Yahoo!, Inc., v. La Ligue contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181
(N.D. Cal. 2001).

7. Id.
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providing a service from abroad that infringes in the U.S., but that will not
enable further infringement outside the U.S. So, again, if the court wants to
award damages for possible infringement outside the U.S., it will have to
apply the respective foreign laws and again the outcome may be different,
the conduct may not constitute infringement at the place where the service
is provided, for example, or in other places where the service can be
accessed.
Moving to the issue of recognition and enforcement. So, this assumes
that you have obtained a judgment in the U.S. and the scope of this
judgment may vary depending on these issues I just briefly raised. The
second step would be enforcing the judgment, unless of course the
defendant voluntarily complies with the judgment, which, especially when
larger companies are involved, may be the case, because there may be
negative other impacts for not complying with a judgment in the U.S. even
though it may not legally be enforceable in other countries. But assuming
you will have to enforce the judgment because the defendant does not
voluntarily comply, first you will have to look at whether you can enforce
the judgment locally, maybe because the other party has local assets, or do
you have to go and enforce the judgment abroad? Another preliminary
issue is related to the type of remedy that you sought. How is the judgment
enforced? If it is a damages award, obviously you want to get hold of assets
satisfying your award. If it is a preliminary injunction, there may be
different measures, for example, removing material from a server or
blocking a specific service or Internet address, etcetera. So, with respect to
whatever it is that the judgment says, you may have to take different
measures to enforce the judgment. If it is a permanent injunction also likely
noncompliance will trigger contempt of court proceedings or similar
remedies in other countries, fines or penalties, and possibly if the fines are
not paid, even a threat of imprisonment.
Looking at whether you can enforce a judgment locally, often a party
that operates offshore is not as offshore as it seems at first sight. Often you
will be able to find some local assets. Just by way of example-by the way,
assets of the company and possibly not only the company, but the directors
or officers of the company, under a theory if you can pierce a corporate
veil, for example-if the whole corporate structure is a sham and the
officers are really based in the United States and just set up a foreign
corporation or foreign entity to avoid exposure. So you may want to look at
both of these scenarios, either assets of the company, or assets of
individuals that are in the company. Those may be monetary assets, but it
may also be other assets which are often overlooked, for example,
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intellectual property rights. The company may have patents registered in
the United States or in another country where you want to enforce the
judgment. It may have trademarks registered here and all these assets may
be subject to attachment. It may have domain names registered in the U.S.
or in another country where you may enforce the judgment. It may have
interest, stocks or shares or rights to receive revenue from local affiliates or
other companies. It may have claims against customers or business partners
or advertisers in the U.S. So all these are possible assets that you might
want to seek out if you want to enforce the judgment locally. The other
thing to take into consideration is that even though the company may not
have assets in the country where you obtained the judgment, it may have
assets in a country that is very likely to enforce and recognize the
judgment. For example, in the European Union, under the Brussels
regulation dealing with jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement, any
other member state of the European Union is required to give full faith and
credit to a judgment from another member state. So, even without review
of whether the court of origin has jurisdiction over the matter, the judgment
will have to be enforced. So basically, if you have assets anywhere in
Europe, and the plaintiff is able to obtain a judgment in a European Union
state, then the assets all over Europe are subject to enforcement under that
judgment. And again this includes all the assets I mentioned, specifically
intellectual property rights or patents, or trademarks, or domain names.
Other issues to consider, as the defendant in the action, you may not
only want to look at the status quo, but also may want to look to the future,
whether you need the mobility to either move assets to other countries, and
you may find yourself restricted by doing that if there is an outstanding
judgment in such country. Or, if you are limited in your personal mobility,
just because there may be fines or penalties or possible imprisonment if
you are traveling to countries-which is often an incentive for companies,
even though they do operate offshore, to comply with judgments just
because they find themselves too restricted in their future business
operations.
Regarding the prospects of recognition and enforcement, if you will
actually have to go to a foreign country, just quickly, the requirements that
are generally tested by foreign courts, or whether the court of origin had
jurisdiction to either matter, and that is obviously often an issue in these
cases. To the extent, for example, that the U.S. court exercised jurisdiction
based on the minimum contacts that it found, that other courts hold to be
excessive, you are unlikely to have your judgment recognized in other
countries.
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Other requirements are proper service and fair proceedings which
may or may not be an issue. Proper service may be an issue especially in
preliminary injunctions when those are ex-parte injunctions, for example,
those are unlikely to be enforced or it may be an issue if you just cannot
find an address to serve process on a foreign provider. Thirdly, no violation
of public policy that, for example, came up in the Yahoo case where Yahoo
sought a declaratory judgment in the U.S., that the French order is not
enforceable because it violates U.S. foreign policy.' The court agreed with
Yahoo based on a free speech argument, that complying with the French
order and shutting down that service would be a violation of the free speech9
rights in the United States and, thus, be a violation of public policy here.
So the French order stands as it is in France but is not enforceable in the
United States. And, as long as Yahoo does not have assets in France, or as
long as directors of Yahoo do not travel there, they may be fine for now,
but nobody knows what happens in the future.
The third issue, and I think I am close to the end, to the extent that it
is difficult to enforce judgments abroad, or to enforce your intellectual
property rights abroad, what you can increasingly observe is that parties
just focus on different potential defendants. They may not want to go and
sue the provider of an infringing service in Tuvalu just because they find it
too difficult to find local assets or to enforce a judgment abroad,10 but they
may want to focus on local parties that they might be able to sue in the
same matter. And some of the potential parties are obviously users of the
service, people that download or share files, and use the software to do that.
Increasingly, other intermediaries like Internet service providers, payment
providers, credit card companies, employers, and universities are often
targeted to try and shut down use of their networks and facilities for these
infringing activities. You may want to look at ICANN [Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers] domain name registers and
domain name registries and registrars, to maybe strip a domain name from
a party that is based offshore and you may look to business partners,
advertisers, maybe even investors in the foreign companies. So, I believe
that is a shift that we see more and more frequently: that, to the extent
enforcement of your rights in an offshore infringement context becomes
more difficult, plaintiffs tend to focus on local parties, on local defendants.
MR. GOLDSTEIN: Thank you very much Rufus. I would like to
8. Yahoo!, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181.

9. Id.
10. Tuvalu is located in Oceania, and consists of nine small islands in the South Pacific
Ocean, about one-half of the way from Hawaii to Australia.
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turn now to Larry Hadley. We will start the Kazaa discussion.
MR. HADLEY: I am sure that some of you are familiar with the
ongoing litigation involving, what I describe, as the legality of the
peer-to-peer software that is distributed by a number of companies under
various names, both here and abroad. I currently represent one of those
companies, Sharman Networks, in their legal sense, in the action that was
brought by the recording industry, the movie studios and the publishers.
Mr. Kendall, to my left, represents the movie studio plaintiffs in that action.
Since that is ongoing litigation, my remarks are going to be limited to my
own personal views of the case. I did not really intend to come as a
representative of Sharman and debate the merits of that litigation. That will
happen in court. But, in fact, I was kind of pleased to see that, in the
description of who my client is, that it at least said they were the distributor
of the Kazaa peer-to-peer software. I had a feeling that, if Mr. Kendall got a
hold of the participant list, you would have seen something like that I
represented "the illegal file sharing service that is the mother of all pirates."
But that being said, I would be happy to give my views about the case
during the question and answer period, and answer any questions that I can
about it.
The topic that we have today is certainly not as weighty as the topic
that we had during the lunch session. Although, if you apply the twenty
year look back standard, I have a feeling that twenty years from now, our
children will look back and say, "what was all the fuss about?" just like we
might look back today and say what was all the fuss about player pianos,
photocopy machines, and even the Betamax machine. I also think, though,
that the case itself, and the issue in general, really raises some fascinating
legal questions. Unlike Professor Goldstein, I think that the topic is
extremely broad and that the legal issues that are raised, not only by the
litigation itself, but by the overall question of enforcing copyrights in the
type of international environment that we exist in today, with the
technology that we have today, is an extremely broad topic and that there
are really no easy answers for some of the questions that are raised. I think
the first speaker, Rufus, only served to highlight the breadth given the
number of issues that he went over in detail. What I did intend to do with
the topic in mind was maybe just fill in a little bit of some of the
granularity of the outline that Rufus covered.
I think that with respect to the case involving peer-to-peer software,
or even all of the cases involving it, one of the most fascinating issues that
is raised is really who should decide these issues? Whether it should be
political branches; if so, what political branches? Whether it should be the
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judicial branches? And, if it is the political or the judicial branches, then
where, which branch is the most appropriate and what location is the most
appropriate to decide these issues? I think that most of them have been
decided in courts, and they will probably continue to be decided in courts,
although there is both domestic and international legislation that is being
proposed and pending. Twenty years from now, we may ultimately see
legislative solutions to some of the questions that are being posed right now
and, from my standpoint, I think that may very well be the best solution. In
terms of enforcement in courts though, as Rufus mentioned, the first
question is what court do you look to? Clearly, copyrights can be enforced
in both U.S. courts and in foreign courts or foreign jurisdictions. The
United States is party to international treaties that allow for the
enforcement of copyrights abroad depending on what countries are
signatory to those conventions and when the copyrights were obtained or
published. Examples are the Berne Convention" and the Universal
Copyright Convention. 12 I think that enforcement overseas often depends
on who the target of the enforcement action is, and the legal theory of
enforcement and the nature of the alleged infringing activity. Some of those
issues will determine whether it is in the copyright holder's interest to
pursue an answer to some of these legal questions overseas or to do it here.
And to some extent it will also depend on the nature of the action that is
being challenged and again the technology involved.
To take a simple example, if somebody is making bootleg CDs or
cassettes overseas and distributing them into the United States, if you have
a clearly identifiable maker and distributor in a country that is a signatory
to, for example, the Berne Convention, in most instances, it will be much
easier to pursue that person overseas, especially if they do not have assets
in the U.S., other than perhaps the material that is being imported into the
U.S., in which case you may be able to get some sort of injunction against
the material itself and stop the import.' 3 On the other hand, if your goal was
to stop the technology that was being used to make the bootleg CDs, then
that may raise some more complicated legal issues that may make
enforcement overseas more difficult. I think that so far what we have seen
in this area as newer technologies and different technologies cross paths
with copyright laws, is an attempt to resolve these in United States courts.

11. Berne Convention, Sept. 9, 1886, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 715,
http://www.wipo.intlclea/docs/en/wo/woOOlen.htm.
12. Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341,
http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/copyright/images/copyrightconvention.rtf.
13. Berne Convention, supra note 11.
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In my experience, there are three major reasons why you see
enforcement in U.S. courts more than you would see them overseas, at least
right now. One is that at least the holders of the U.S. copyrights have
counsel that they are comfortable with that they work with on a daily basis,
and when they go into court, particularly dealing with issues that may be
somewhat novel, they are more comfortable using counsel that they use on
a day-to-day basis that they trust and that they are familiar with. I think it is
only natural to want to bring the action in a place where they can have
counsel that they are familiar with and they are comfortable with. Another
factor that I think plays into initially enforcing or trying to enforce in the
United States is the fact that the United States has a much more developed
body of law in the area. It has courts that are more predictable, perhaps,
than courts overseas. And then, finally, I think that just the expense factor
plays into it. It is probably, more often than not, more expensive to bring a
case overseas and it raises sort of the unknown factor to a large extent. If
the action is brought in the United States, as Rufus mentioned, I think that
there are three issues that will come up in every case, particularly over
when the target or the defendant is a foreign entity: one is personal
jurisdiction, the second is the reach of the U.S. copyright laws over the
foreign entities, and that is really another way of talking about subject
matter jurisdiction, and then the final issue of course will be enforcement if
you are successful.
We have had, in the case that is pending, most recent proceedings
involving personal and jurisdiction over our client, Sharman Networks,
which is a Vanuatu corporation1 4 that does business in Australia and makes
the software at issue available on servers in Denmark, and that has raised a
lot of issues on the personal jurisdiction side that were resolved against us
in a recent opinion by the district court in Los Angeles.' 5 In looking at the
personal jurisdiction issues, though, I think that the district court's opinion
does have some implications both for U.S. holders of copyrights, U.S.
publishers, and foreign entities as well. I think it will be interesting to see
how these standards continue to evolve over time and whether this
particular decision is followed and to what extent.
The standards for personal jurisdiction have been around for a long
time. They have been very well developed and, just as a general sense, if a
foreign entity is either doing business in the United States, directs
somebody else to do business in the United States, then typically that entity
14. Vanuatu is located in Oceania. It is a Y-shaped chain of four main islands and eighty
smaller islands with the terrain mainly mountains of volcanic origin.
15. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 243 F. Supp.2d 1073.
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will be subject to U.S. jurisdiction. But in the case involving Sharman,
there was really more to it than that, and it was not just the matter of
technology being different. In my view, the standards that have been
around for a long time have been applied over the course of that time to
new and different technologies. Every time a new technology comes up,
often times you will see cases involving personal jurisdiction, everything
from telephone solicitations to computers, to even the fact that travel is
easier. But I think that, in the district court's opinion in the jurisdictional
challenge that Sharman faced, the court came up with a couple of things
that is, as I said, may need to be revisited as we go forward.
Let me just give you a couple of examples. The court's opinion found
that on the purposeful availment test, that there was jurisdiction for
basically three reasons. The first reason that the court cited was that two
million or so California residents had probably downloaded the software
from the servers that Sharman maintained in Denmark and were using the
software. The problem that I see with that is that there was really no more
purposeful availment by people in California downloading the software
than if the two million California residents flew to Denmark and purchased
the software. Another problem with that test is that it kind of put an
undefined numbers factor on a personal jurisdiction or purposeful
availment test without any real standards. So, in other words, will there
now be some sort of test that if you have a million people using software or
downloading information from a website, will that give rise to jurisdiction,
or is it something less? And it also, looking at just the numbers, it will
subject companies posting information available for downloading on a
website, whether it be software or anything else, subject to jurisdiction any
place where that information is popular.
Another factor that the court looked at, that I think can create some
problems, is that the court said that the software indirectly generates
revenue for Sharman. The problem with that analysis, just looking at the
revenue side of things or the commercial aspect of what is made available
on a website, is that it does not take into account how the content of the
web site ends up with the end user or the receiver. It does not take into
account exactly how the commercialization takes place, or whether the end
user is the entity or the person who is paying the revenue, and in this case it
is not the end users of the peer-to-peer software that pay the revenue, it is
advertisers that may or may not have been located in California. It just was
not a factor in the court's opinion.
The third thing that court said is that the users have to agree to what
essentially is known as a click-wrap license in order to install the software
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and that was a reason to have personal jurisdiction. The problem with that
is the court did not consider where that license was formed. I would
contend that the license is really formed in Australia or Denmark and that it
is no different than if somebody, two million California residents again, got
in airplanes or whatever and flew to Australia and entered into licenses
there. Under those circumstances, I do not think there would be much
debate that Sharman would not have been subject to personal jurisdiction in
California. Also, the opinion did not take into account the terms of the
license, or whether the license itself had anything to do with the conduct
that was at issue in the case and, in fact, the license agreement at issue was
designed to tell people, in part, that they should only use the software for
legal purposes.
The same can be said of the effects test that the court looked at. The
court essentially said that the effects test would apply also because of two
reasons: one, the users of software were infringing copyrights, or at least
allegedly infringing copyrights, and that Sharman was aware at least
constructively, if not actually, that this was going on, and that the
copyrights were held mostly by California based companies. The problem
that I see there is that it essentially reads the intent element of vicarious
copyright infringement out of the cause of action. The court basically
substituted knowledge for intent. And, in my view, knowledge is not the
same thing as intent. There is something that has to bridge that gap before
knowledge can give rise to intent and I think that thing that is missing is an
ability to control or at least stop the infringement from taking place and that
was something that was not considered in the effects test and in fact you do
see different opinions on this. I think the recent California Supreme Court
decision in Pavlovich 16 took a different tact on the effects test. There is a
recent case involving the Reverend Jerry Falwell out of, I believe, the
just a couple of weeks ago that took a slightly
district court in Virginia
17
different tact on that.
In terms of the other two issues, the subject matter or the reach of
U.S. copyright laws, I think for the most part that is going to be coextensive
with the reach of the effects test and that really leaves enforcement, and
Rufus touched on a lot of important issues regarding enforcement. I will

16. Pavlovich v. Superior Court of Santa Clara, 58 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002).
17. On March 4, 2003, a federal judge in Virginia dismissed Jerry Falwell's attempt to gain
control over the web site JerryFalwell.com, agreeing with the defendant Gary Cohn that the court
did not have jurisdiction over the matter since Cohn did not live, work in, or target the people in
the state of Virginia. See Lisa M. Bowman, Court Dismisses Falwell Domain Name Case, CNET
NEWS.COM, Mar. 5, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2100-1028-991215.html.
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only add that I think that is probably the most important issue, especially if
the target of the infringement does not have assets in the U.S. In our firm,
when we look at cases from a plaintiffs standpoint, and I do a fair amount
of plaintiff's work in patent cases and trade secret cases, I always start just
the opposite of what I learned in law school. I look at damages first. I look
at enforcement first. And, if I cannot collect damages or I cannot seek an
enforceable judgment that is going to be worth something to the client, then
it is not worth bringing the action in a U.S. jurisdiction, even if I can prove
liability ten times over. With that being said, if you do get a judgment in
the U.S. court, and you cannot enforce it here, then you are going to have to
enforce it overseas and you are going to be litigating the same issues that
you would be litigating if you brought it overseas in the first place.
MR. GOLDSTEIN: I apologize for trying to bring things to a close,
but I do want to leave at least some time for discussion afterwards.
MR. KENDALL: Like Mr. Hadley, my remarks are going to be my
own, and not my clients, and I take as my text Chapter 1, Verse 9, King
James version of Ecclesiastics: "The thing that hath been, it is that which
shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no
new thing under the sun." Now it is very dangerous with a conference like
this to say there is no new thing under the sun. What I mean, of course, is
not technology, but rather the application of law to technology. I think
many problems which appear radically new in the Internet context have
been confronted by the law in the past. Indeed, there are areas of the law,
and I think you are probably familiar with them, which have enjoyed a
surprising renaissance. I do not think twenty years ago, if we had been
talking, any of us could have imaged the frisky legal career of a tort like
trespass to chattels in the twenty-first century. Judge Frank Easterbrook
about seven years ago wrote an article called "The Law of the Horse" 8 and
he pointed out that 150 years ago the horse was very important to society,
but there was no specific law which developed relating to horses; rather,
that law was derived from all kinds of different areas like contract,
property, warranties. And, any effort to collect all of the law of the horse
into a single doctrine, he pointed out, was doomed to be both shallow and
to miss underlying unifying principles. Only by looking to the broader rules
could you understand properly the law that would govern horses in any
particular transaction.
We are considering here jurisdictional issues relating to the

18. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
207 (1996).
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enforcement of U.S. copyrights, particularly in the context of commercial
Internet enterprises which transcend national boundaries. I think, in fact,
that the law relating to these questions is pretty well established because
these same long arm jurisdictional principles have been wrestled with by
courts for over 100 years, and that the questions are really not as novel or
as difficult as they may seem. Now, in my time I am not going to address
the enforcement of U.S. copyrights abroad. There is no international
tribunal, so as Rufus mentioned, you are going to have to rely on foreign
counsel or self-help measures such as predator drones armed with hellfire
missiles-but only the CIA has those, not Hilary Rosen-Wired Magazine
to the contrary, notwithstanding. The jurisdictional questions which come
up in these cases, where you sue in the United States to try to vindicate a
violation of U.S. copyright by a company that claims "we are immune to
jurisdiction because we are foreign," has been litigated a lot. I know if you
think back to your first year procedure classes-you may not want to do
that-but you will remember the International Shoe line of cases, and there
the court wrestled with jurisdiction under the due process clause which was
asserted over an entity which did not have a physical presence in the forum
state.' 9 What the Supreme Court said, of course, was that if there were
adequate minimum contacts with that state such that you did not violate
traditional notions of fair play, then that would found jurisdiction even over
that out-of-state entity.20 Now that was hardly a model of clarity, and the
Supreme Court in the Burger King 2' case I think charitably called its earlier
formulation nebulus, but it does give some guidance because it basically
says if an entity has contacts with a forum state, they may be sufficient to
hold you even though you are not present there. You have to look at the
substantiality of the contacts there. Larry averted to the evolution of a
three-part test, and that is: first, did the defendant somehow purposefully
avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state;
second, does the asserted cause of action arise out of that conduct of
activities; and, third is it reasonable to hold the defendant in the forum?
The Courts of Appeal really all emphasize those three factors, although the
exact formulation varies.
Now, just because a long arm statute is on the books does not
necessarily mean that you are going to find jurisdiction. In the World-Wide
Volkswagen case an Oklahoma court, as you recall, was trying to assert
jurisdiction over a New York car dealer, that it sold a VW to a New York
19. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
20. Id.
21. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).

60

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:45

resident who drives it to Oklahoma and has an accident there.22 It was
found that there was no jurisdiction, under the long arm statute, because the
New York car dealer had not had the requisite contacts with Oklahoma.23
Federal rule 4(k)2 4 of the federal rules was amended in 1993 to specially
treat defendants who are foreign entities. It said that you could aggregate
the contacts. If you sued them in one jurisdiction you can aggregate their
contacts all over the United States to determine whether there was the
requisite activity in the United States to hold them in a particular state.
These concepts, when courts began dealing with Internet activities, courts
began applying these very well settled principles.
One of my favorite cases is the Zippo manufacturing case, actually a
well-known district court case from 1997,5 pitting on one hand the
traditional Zippo manufacturing company that makes lighters, against
Zippo.com, an Internet news agency based in Sunnyvale, not very far from
here. And the question was: had the Internet company had sufficient
contact with Pennsylvania to justify the exercise of jurisdiction? 26 The
Zippo court really analyzed the various ways a web site or conduct on the
Internet might subject you to jurisdiction, and it really articulated a sliding
scale, and that sliding scale has been very influential and in some way or
another almost all the courts that deal with these issues consider the scale.
On the one hand, there is the totally passive web site. You just put up a web
site and that can be accessed from the forum state. Without more, that is
not going to subject you to jurisdiction. On the other end of the scale is the
web site that you use to transact business-to advertise, make contracts,
sell goods. That is plainly commercial activity. What the court in the Zippo
case wrestled with was something in the middle, which was an interactive
web site stopping somewhere short of the conduct of business. But there
the court held there was jurisdiction because Zippo.com did solicit
subscribers over its website. It had 3000 subscribers in Pennsylvania and
that was held enough to justify Zippo lighter company having jurisdiction
to bring a lawsuit in Pennsylvania alleging trademark and other
infringements.
The Supreme Court has often emphasized, even before the Internet
era, that companies often reach out electronically or by mail to do business
in other places, so these principles are, I think, well established in some of
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k).
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Penn 1997).
Id.
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the cases although courts do not articulate it. If there is a certain degree of
inequitable conduct, some of the cyber-squatting cases are a good example,
maybe one contact with the forum state is enough to justify jurisdiction.
Now, with respect to Larry, we differ about the conduct of his client
Sharman Networks in the United States. I just want to emphasize, as he did,
some of the things that Judge Wilson found in his opinion. Looking for
contacts of Sharman and the United States is a little bit like looking for hay
in a haystack. You began by seeing that it had twenty million subscribers in
the United States-twenty million subscribers. Of those, at least two
million were in California and those numbers absolutely dwarf the contacts
of most of these other cases. These are people, as he indicated, which had a
click-wrap agreement. Now, I think I just differ with this, if you click a
click-wrap agreement in California with somebody else, you are taking
action in California. You have not gotten on the plane to go to Denmark to
get the software. If you had, maybe that would be a different case, but it
was not the case here. The other thing that happened was Sharman had
lawyers, advertising agents, advertisers, public relations people-a lot of
the Sharman press releases were datelined Los Angeles here-helping to
conduct the business, helping to sell the advertising, helping to get
advertisement revenue. Now, the revenue issue I think is very important
because in this case you had an Internet company deriving at least four
million dollars in ad revenue from the United States in a seven month
period. All these, I think, were plainly enough to say that this company had
purposely availed itself of the privilege of doing business in California and
sufficient to find jurisdiction. There are many cases in state law, I think,
that are more difficult because they may involve something like putting
something in the stream of commerce somewhere else thinking it may have
an impact on California. That is not the case here. I believe that on the
Zippo scale, what Sharman Networks was doing was really conducting
business here.
I would like to say just a word about other legal concepts. I think
Rufus mentioned the Aimster case. It is not only in the area of jurisdiction
that I think the law which presently exists is equipped to deal with Internet
questions. I think in terms of contributory and vicarious copyright liability
itself, those principles are there. They are applicable and a number of
courts have applied them. Piracy is a very big problem on the Internet. I do
not think that the Internet peer-to-peer services justify direct infringement.
They, in fact, recognize that downloading and copying works in their
entirety, that you do not have a license for, is copyright infringement. There
is really no doubt about that. Nobody is making a first amendment case for
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people's ability to copy copyrighted works. All kinds of things are now
being passed around on the Internet. I guess my favorite is the problem
involving cross-stitch needlework. Those patterns are being sold by various
entities. There are now various websites where you can download pirated
cross-stitch needle pattern work if you want to. But the fact is that, in the
area of hard goods policy, nobody really disputes that copying without
licenses can be even a criminal violation. Here, however, the defense is,
well, we are not actually doing the copying. That, again, is a defense well
known to prior laws, and cases like Aimster and Napster have looked to
other situations where people run swap meets or fairs and they know that
copyright infringement is going on-somebody selling bootleg copies of
audiotapes. The fair owner does not sell them but derives revenue from
renting space to the vendors against revenue from parking, refreshments
and admission fees. In those cases, the most famous is the Ninth Circuit
Cherry Auction case,2 7 the court had no trouble saying look, you are
profiting from this copyright infringement, you knew it was going on, you
have sufficient ability to police it, to make you liable. And, in Napster, the
two Napster decisions of the Ninth Circuie 8 and the recent Aimster
decision of the Northern District of Illinois, 2 9 those old well-established
principles were invoked to find liability. One difference, of course, on the
Internet, is that the person who is downloading does not have to pay an
entrance fee to get in this fair, and does not have to pay money to the illegal
hard goods vendor. You get it for free. Is this a great country or what?
MR. GOLDSTEIN: Our final speaker this afternoon is Carl
Oppedahl.
MR. OPPEDAHL: First, I hope that our audience fully appreciates
what a privilege it is to have David and Larry here. It is not very often that
you get to hear from two people on two sides of an extraordinarily
important case that raises so many important issues and I hope you
appreciate what it means that the organizers of this program got these two
speakers to join you. It is really remarkable.
If I were a dentist, the fact that I, with these other four people have
been given a microphone would prompt me to spend sixty seconds on how
important it is to brush and floss regularly, but I am not a dentist, so I will
not do that. I will however spend sixty seconds telling you that you must
make sure that everyone you ever meet the rest of your life is fully aware of
27.
28.
Napster,
29.

Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); A&M, Inc. v.
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
In re Aimster, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
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the importance of registering your copyrights. This is not in the program. It
is not in the syllabus but you get it for another forty-five seconds. If you
register your copyright, if your client registers his or her copyright, if your
cousin who happens to hear about this from you next week, registers their
copyright, and then they go sue somebody, they can get their attorneys fees
paid. This is very different than all the other kinds of lawsuits in the United
States where, in general, if you sue somebody and win, you are still stuck
paying for your own lawyer. But if you happen to have the foresight to
register your copyright, or if you happened to have been told by someone
in this audience to register your copyright, the next thing you know, they
have to pick up the tab for your lawyers and you get statutory damages.
This is not a negligible thing. If there were a single thing that everyone of
you in the audience will do, it is to make sure that everyone you meet for
the rest of your life is told, pay the thirty dollars, fill out the form, send it to
the copyright office, and if you later have to sue somebody your position
will be extraordinarily stronger than if you had not paid the thirty dollars
and filled out the form. That is the end of my public service announcement.
Some of you in the audience are law students trying to make career
decisions. Some of you have technical backgrounds of one kind or another,
perhaps knowledgeable about electronics, about networks, knowledgeable
about how the Internet works, knowledgeable about software. Please,
please, please give due consideration to the possibility that you can give
your talents to the world of intellectual property. Please do so. There are
many real life examples of how it makes a big difference to have
technically knowledgeable people in the profession.
David mentioned the Zippo case where the company that makes the
cigarette lighters wanted to get personal jurisdiction over a company in
another state. I happen to be acquainted with the lawyers who were on the
prevailing side in that case and I happen to know exactly how they came up
with the subject matter to put into their briefs to help explain why the
California company Zippo.com had enough contacts with the state of
Pennsylvania that the federal court in Pennsylvania could exercise personal
jurisdiction. They surfed the website of the defendant company. They
pursued a number of different lines of technical inquiry and assembled a
brief that made it very clear to the judge that there were many, many
irrefutable objectively confirmable contacts with the state of Pennsylvania
and that made all the difference in the world in that personal jurisdiction
case. And, I can tell you from some familiarity with the personalities
involved, that different lawyers might well not have done the technical
inquiry and would have put in a crummy brief that just said "we really
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think we have personal jurisdiction" or something like that and would not
have prevailed. Technical competence on the part of lawyers involved in
that case made a difference in that outcome.
I think of one of the things that Rufus described which is that
sometimes you may have somebody who is not in a place over which you
could easily get jurisdiction, perhaps someone in a foreign country, and you
would like to bring an end to their conduct that troubles you. A technically
knowledgeable lawyer would explore things that Rufus mentioned; for
example, by any chance is the web server actually in the United States? I
have an actual case where we had a client who was very concerned about
some conduct on the part of someone in India, and the question was what
can be done about it? It was an intellectual property matter and as it
happens we were able to investigate and study the situation and it
eventually became clear that although the company was in India and
although if you ever sent the money you would be sending it to somebody
in India, the web server was actually in Southern California. There is a
really good reason for that, of course, most of their customers were in the
U.S. and they wanted it to be easy for those customers to reach the web
page without a big delay. When you click, you want the image to come up
on the screen right away and if the server had been for example in India,
maybe the connections would not have been as good and the website would
not respond as well. They had put their web site in California and the very
thing Rufus described, the next thing you know, all that was necessary was
to write one letter to a targeted individual or entity in Southern California
and the relief that was desired was gotten just by writing a letter and
investing thirty-seven cents in postage. Different lawyers not technically
trained, not technically knowledgeable, might not have come to the point of
knowing that that letter could be written and that for thirty-seven cents the
problem could be solved-and that gets back to one of my themes. Those
of you in the audience who are trying to make career decisions, I hope, will
think of giving your technical talents to the intellectual property bar.
Technical training can also help you in tailoring an injunction.
When
you are trying to get an injunction, you always face the prospect that the
court is going to say well fine, but to get your injunction, you are going to
have to post a bond of ten million dollars. And, if only you can think of
how to tailor the injunction so that it is extremely narrow, focused
specifically on some narrow thing, you may well be able to convince the
judge that the bond that is called for is a much smaller bond. Maybe no
bond at all. A narrowly crafted injunction is more likely to be something
you can convince a foreign judge to swallow than some sweeping
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injunction that asks for everything starting with the letter A and finishing
with the letter Z. Narrowly crafted injunctions carefully tailored to the
circumstance may well serve your client better, because you might be able
to get it as compared to a broad injunction. That will only work if you or
your coworkers, or both, are in a position to be technologically
knowledgeable enough to know what to ask for. I think of one case where
we were seeking a copyright remedy against somebody and it had to do
with a microchip and a keyboard. A different lawyer perhaps might have
asked for an injunction that said take all the keyboards and run a bulldozer
over them and destroy them and that is the kind of injunction you would
love to get, if you could get it, because then all their keyboards get run over
by a bulldozer. However, if you asked for something narrower, maybe it is
easier to get it. And, in this particular case, the relief we asked for was
merely that it turns out when you turn on the chip it copies some stuff from
ROM into RAM and it performs a certain application feature and as far as
we were concerned, as long as they could not turn on the chip, that was
enough. They could keep the keyboards, but they just cannot apply power
to them. That injunction was more narrowly tailored and stood a better
chance of being granted. The case ended up settling and it never got that
far, but had the case not settled, that narrowly tailored injunction might
well have given the client everything it needed and serve the copyright
needs with a better chance of being granted.
Personal jurisdiction, jurisdiction where the court is distant from the
plaintiff, jurisdiction where the court is distant from the defendant,
especially, is a very pesky area. As David described, it is not a new
problem. International Shoe is a case where this came up. We have all read
the case, we have all thought about fair play and substantial justice and
minimum contacts and all that; and yet, I sit right now representing an
accused defendant in an intellectual property case who is located actually
here in Northern California. He was sued in the Southern District of New
York. We filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We
argued that our Northern California client does not have contacts with New
York City sufficient to justify jurisdiction there. We filed the motion to
dismiss two years and six months ago and it has not been decided yet. This
tells you a couple of things. It probably tells you that the Southern District
of New York is one of the bars with a really big backlog of cases and it is
very hard for the judges to decide everything that is in front of them. It also
perhaps tells you that there are still vexing personal jurisdiction issues even
within the U.S., not to mention vexing jurisdiction issues internationally as
we described here. We have a little tickler in our calendar system, and
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every 12 months, we write a letter to the judge saying, you know, our
motion has now been outstanding for another year. In another six months, I
will be writing a third letter to the judge saying, you know, we would love
it if you could decide our motion. These things really, really matter.
In addition to being an intellectual property lawyer I am a director of
a small nonprofit group that brought a DSL system to the neighborhood
where I live in the mountains of Colorado because nobody else would bring
in broadband. The phone company would not bring it in. The cable
company would not bring it in. And, as a director of this nonprofit Internet
co-op, I am exposed to the world of Internet service providers and how the
30
world of copyright effects them. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
which many of you are familiar with, provides a number of measures that
effect Internet service providers-takedown provisions. If I, director of this
nonprofit, get a letter in the mail from a lawyer that says you are in a heap
of trouble, you have to take down so-and-so's web site, IS and ISP will be
under extraordinary pressure to take down the web site based on nothing
more than the signed paper that came from the lawyer. Our little group, as a
nonprofit, where are we going to find the volunteer time and energy to deal
with letters like that. It is very tough-the subpoena power of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act. You have all read about the recent case where a
copyright enforcer asked Verizon, the telephone company, to roll over and
reveal the identity of one of their customers and the court said they have
to 3' and if I get a subpoena like that I am going to have to try to figure out
whether to hand over personal information of one of the handful of
subscribers who belong to our little ISP. Things the Congress does really
affect ordinary folks, and my hope is that all of us can try to be good
influences on future lawmaking, future statute drafting to attempt to do a
good balance among different elements of society that are affected by
copyright law, for example.
Well, today's theme is copyright, and international copyright in
particular, and in that theme I guess I will just try to react to a few things
that I heard from others on the panel here. The first of course is that bits are
bits, the image that I see on my computer screen and the image that is put
up on this projection screen, the music that I listen to from an M3P player,
the newspaper that I read every morning sitting at my computer, they are
all bits, and bits are bits. I mean, you know, this string of ones and zeros is
the same as the next string of ones and zeros in terms of how it propagates.
30. 17 U.S.C.S. § 512(c) (1998).
31. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Serv. Inc., 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11250 (2003) (denying Verizon's emergency motion for stay).
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And in this world, bits are fast. Five years ago, bits were not fast, but by
now lots and lots of people have broadband connections to the Internet, in
their homes and in their offices, on university campuses, bits are fast. Five
years ago, it would have been unthinkable that you could push a button,
record something that you saw on the television and then push another
button and send it to your friends so that they could watch the T.V. show
that you just saw, or a videotape of baby taking baby's first step, or
whatever it might be. Passing a moving video image to somebody far away
by means of bits was not workable five years ago, but now it is
commonplace. You can get a machine, a video recorder that records things
on a hard disk that explicitly is designed so that you can push a button and
send the T.V. show to your friends. Bits are fast. And, of course, bits are on
the Internet and the Internet was designed so that if a nuclear weapon
destroyed part of it, the rest of the Internet would re-route its connections
so that everything could get through anyway, right? Well that same Internet
that is supposed to be self-healing in the face of nuclear weapons also tends
to be self-healing in the face of efforts to block data flow. China tries to
keep track of who gets to see which websites and China largely fails in that
effort because there are ways that the Internet can pass data in this way,
that way or the other.
And, we get to Larry's point, twenty years from when Betamax first
came out, you look back and you sort of say well, society adjusted
somehow. However much of a disruption it was that video recorders
existed, somehow society exists now twenty years later and everyone
moves onward. Twenty years from now will we look back and figure out
how we feel about peer-to-peer file sharing? Twenty years from now will
we figure out how do we feel about the fact that bits are fast and that bits
are bits and that anything can be effortlessly copied with no loss of quality
from one point to the next? Twenty years from now, will society have
adjusted to that? Well yes, of course, it will have. By definition, society
always adjusts to changes. We adjusted to a world where we do not use
horses to get from here to there anymore; yes, society adjusts. Will it adjust
comfortably or will it adjust with great pain and strain? Well, of course, it
will be great pain and strain. I personally make my living with intellectual
property and my life is vested in the idea that there are such things as
intellectual property rights and yet I sit here wondering how the world of
copyright is going to adjust to a world where bits are bits and bits are fast
and bits are on the Internet. Some rock musician, I thought it was David
Bowie, when Napster first came along, he was quoted as saying something
like, "I think the world will change and I think we will not make a living
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selling records anymore and I think we will make a living selling T-shirts
and concert tickets." And I think it was David Bowie, but I am just not
sure. That may be a shift that will happen, and if it does, it will be one that
we all have to figure out what to do about. I do not think any of us at this
table have answers, but it is certainly fun to be here.
MR. GOLDSTEIN: Thank you very much Carl, thank you all. We
have time for some questions.
AUDIENCE: For five bonus points, who said, and when, and to
whom, "so where is all this substantial non-infringing use you were telling
me about Mr. Boies?" That was about the Napster case.3 2 I find
peer-to-peer software very interesting, but technically and because of the
jurisdictional issues that we talked about, one observation I made a couple
years ago, when I was looking at Napster, was the opportunity for
malicious use was pervasive. For example, with another Trojan horse, so to
speak, who would rename a bunch of files from .doc to .mpg all of a
sudden your work product would be exposed to something else. The
question I have for people who have large law firms, is what is your policy
on installation of peer-to-peer file sharing software by your attorneys?
MR. KENDALL: It is really very simple. Those are firm computers.
We represent a number of clients who try to obey the law. It may be that
working on a case somebody, supervised, may need to use them, but they
are not on the firm computers.
MR. HADLEY: Our law firm is not large.
(LAUGHTER)
MR. OPPEDAHL: As a director of an Internet Service Provider, a
little tiny ISP in the mountains of Colorado, I can tell you that we worry
about peer-to-peer file sharing because one person running peer-to-peer on
our network makes our bill go way up. It costs us a lot more money for
what we connect to the Internet backbone for. And so we have a rule
against peer-to-peer file sharing in our system except for people who are
willing to pay a lot of extra money to cover what it costs us to support their
bandwidth, but we would not even care whether they were sending pictures
of baby taking baby's first steps, which would presume to be a work where
they own the copyright, or a work that infringes. In either case, the high
data flow would be a problem for us. ISPs have a very odd role in all of
this. It is a very odd position to be an ISP.
MR. HADLEY: Let me give you a little bit more of a serious answer.
32. Mr. David Boies represented the Defendant in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
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I think that right now peer-to-peer file sharing software is used mostly for
entertainment. There was a time, not too long ago, where I was with a law
firm and I remember we had a very big debate as to whether we should
have Intemet access for the attorneys. I cannot imagine practicing law right
now without Internet access. It would be a major handicap. It would put me
at a big disadvantage vis-A-vis the likes of Mr. Kendall, even more so than I
may be already. We do a lot of research over the Internet, and in this
current Kazaa case, for the briefs that I write, I use the Internet. I think that
what we will see over time, assuming that peer-to-peer evolves consistently
with the overall Internet, is that you will see business uses and business
applications for peer-to-peer. You do not have that today and so I think
right now we would not use it because we do not want to divert people's
attention away from work to entertainment. But I think, in the future, there
will be a use for it in the business context and we all may be using it.
MR. PICHLER: Currently not installed and I do not think we would
get approval.
MR. GOLDSTEIN: I think Fred was next.
MR. VON LOHMANN: I just cannot resist on this peer-to-peer
stuff. Full disclosure. I represent one of the co-defendants in the Morpheus,
Kazaa, Grokster case.33 I will say this, I used to work at a large law firm. I
respond to your question about large law firms, by asking, at any large law
firm, I ask whether an associate is allowed to install any software on their
desktop of any kind. Certainly, at my large law firm, that was absolutely
forbidden by the high priests of the IT department. As for the law firm I
work for now, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, we maintain a Morpheus
node, a Gnutella node, on our network open to the Internet. We distribute
our documents through that node along with the website. It is a perfectly
viable distribution channel. And, on the security question, frankly
Microsoft Outlook has transferred far more in the way of security
vulnerability than any peer-to-peer, in fact in all peer-to-peer combined. So
this notion that peer-to-peer has immense security vulnerability, I haven't
seen it. Returning to the question of jurisdiction, although much of
copyright law has been on an international convergence for some time,
taking the form of treaties like Berne, now part of TRIPS, it is, and I think
Lawrence mentioned this expressly, and I would like to hear the opinions
of the other panelists, with respect to secondary copyright liability it is
actually the case, certainly in my research it appeared that there is very

33. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
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little in the way of consensus in the international copyright world regarding
the precise scope and standards of secondary liability principles. I think
that is not surprising given the fact that secondary copyright liability
principles touch on technology policy and innovation policy, something
that I think different countries can plausibly disagree about. So, I guess my
question to the panel is, in light of the disagreement among different
countries or perhaps the lack of development among different countries of
secondary copyright liability principles, what impact do you think that will
have on the efforts to push one country's principles onto citizens of
another?
MR. OPPEDAHL: If I can try to give a bit of a response, I see a
general trend with a sort of a race toward the most restrictive for
intellectual property around the world. I see it most advanced in the
trademark area where, for example, with the ICANN domain name policies
and other things, you end up with a situation where whichever country in
the world has the strictest limits on what somebody could do with respect
to trademarks, that ends up being sort of the rule for the whole world on
Internet domain names. I think many of the treaty initiatives are working
towards the situation where the most restrictive rule in any country will
become in broad strokes, the rule in most countries. I think there is a
general trend there.
MR. PICHLER: I agree with that view, Fred, that despite substantial
harmonization, there is significant differences in the copyright laws.
Despite Berne, which does not deal with all of these issues, especially in
the area of secondary infringement but also in the area of private use,
copies for private use, and even though the source may be legal, there are
differences there. I am not hopeful that these differences will be solved on
an international level anytime soon. Actually I think what we observe right
now, if we look at the attempts to come up with international treaties in the
area, is that the disagreement and the policy issues are so complex and not
resolved on a national level, that it is just too soon to hope for an
international solution and that is what we see in the Hague Judgments
Enforcement Convention 34 which is basically stalled and failed when it
started dealing with electronic commerce issues. Specifically on the
secondary infringement issue, yes, I do believe the outcome would be
different. The outcome was different in the Netherlands, where the Kazaa
case has been decided, and would be different I believe under German law,

34. Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, Geneva.
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and possibly under the laws of many other countries.
MR. GOLDSTEIN: I would just add as a historical answer to that,
where an international consensus over what a legal norm should be does
not emerge as apparently it is not emerging right now. What you will find
happening is individual countries departing from the principle of
extraterritoriality and effectively exporting whatever their, in this case,
secondary liability norm will be. The United States did that in the patent
law and sections 102(f) 35 and 271(f) and (g)36 effectively extending
secondary liability U.S. style worldwide. There is no reason to think, I hate
to use the phrase, the U.S. might make a "preemptive strike" with respect
to secondary liability in the copyright field as well. And, there is no
constitutional limit on it, only a limit of notions of comity.
AUDIENCE: INAUDIBLE.
MR. OPPEDAHL: Under U.S. law, a copyright owner is free to give
up their copyright rights to the public simply to surrender them to the
public or to license them on any terms they like. A copyright owner could
expressly say "I disclaim all the term beyond 17 years" for a copyright if
they so choose. Perhaps the biggest example of this that we see is open
source software licensing where people will contribute to some open source
collective project under circumstances where everyone is obligated to
license their rights free of charge to the public under certain conditions. So
what we do have is this odd binary right in the statute, but we have freedom
of action in the part of rights holders to give up more than zero and less
than all of those rights.
AUDIENCE: INAUDIBLE.
MR. KENDALL: Without again getting into specific advice to
clients, I think the studios are trying to do that, the record companies are
trying to do that. Those efforts are halting, they are difficult. One problem
you have is it is very difficult to compete with free. You really cannot
compete with free. You can have a DRM system, but I think you have to
add extras to that. I think you have to be responsive to what consumers
want, but one of the big problems is competing with free. But, yes, I think
that the future has got to include, from my prospective, not only litigation
but offering alternatives which are legal, which are easy to use, and which
adds to them.
MR. HADLEY: From Sharman's perspective, that is the solution.
Sharman was formed with DRM in mind. It immediately entered into a
35. 35 U.S.C.S. § 102(f).
36. 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(f) & (g).
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joint venture agreement with a company called Altnet that uses Microsoft
DRM technology. It has, from day one, been trying to secure works that
can be offered peer-to-peer with DRM technology and has been very
successful so far in certain areas in doing that. I don't know, the last
numbers that I saw were something like over 150,000 DRM rights
protected. Works are now available using the Kazaa media desktop, which
is the software. There has been some problems in securing licenses and, if
you are interested in reading more about that, look at our antitrust
37
counterclaim against the studios and the labels who sued us.
MR. KENDALL: The fairness doctrine, alas, has been repealed.
MR. PICHLER: Just one additional remark. I do not believe, maybe
that's pessimistic, that DRM will solve the international legal issues
because you will have other international legal issues. Countries will differ
on what restrictions they will allow. There may be fair use concepts where
DRM technology, what is illegal use here, on technology to deprive you of
certain rights, that are mandatory under specific laws and laws will differ
on these issues I believe.
MR. GOLDSTEIN: I cannot resist before closing. If anyone
questions the ability of shrewd marketers to compete with free, consider the
people who put water in bottles for one dollar and fifty cents. I want to
thank our panel and thank you. This has been a wonderful session.

37. See MGMStudios, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (dismissing ultimately for lack of standing
with regard to Sharman's federal counterclaims and the state counterclaims involving the
Cartwright Act and copyright misuse, and reserving a final ruling on the unfair business practices
claim).

